Showing posts with label Induction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Induction. Show all posts

Monday, April 29, 2019

Automatic sound law induction (Open problems in computational diversity linguistics 3)


The third problem in my list of ten open problems in computational diversity linguistics is a problem that has (to my knowledge) not even been considered as a true problem in computational historical linguistics, so far. Until now, it has been discussed by colleagues only indirectly. This problem, which I call the automatic induction of sound laws, can be described as follows:
Starting from a list of words in a proto-language and their reflexes in a descendant language, try to find the rules by which the ancestral language is converted into the descendant language.
Note that by "rules", in this context, I mean the classical notation that phonologists and historical linguists use in order to convert a source sound in a target sound in a specific environment (see Hall 2000: 73-75). If we consider the following ancestral and descendant words from a fictive language, we can easily find the laws by which the input should be converted into an output — namely, an a should be changed to an e, an e should be changed to an i, and a k changes to s if followed by an i but not if followed by an a.

Input Output
papa pepe
mama meme
kaka keke
keke sisi

Short excursus on linguistic notation of sound laws

Based on the general idea of sound change (or sound laws in classical historical linguistics) as some kind of a function by which a source sound is taken as input and turned into a target sound as output, linguists use a specific notation system for sound laws. In the simplest form of the classical sound law notation, this process is described in the form s > t, where s is the source sound and t is the target sound. Since sound change often relies the on specific conditions of the surrounding context — i.e. it makes a difference if some sound occurs in the beginning or the end of a word — context is added as a condition separated by a /, with an underscore _ referring to the sound in its original phonetic environment. Thus, the phenomenon of voiced stops becoming unvoiced at the end of words in German (e.g. d becoming t), can be written as d > t / _$, where $ denotes the end of a word.

One can see how close this notation comes to regular expressions and according to many scholars, the rules by which languages change with respect to their sound systems do not exceed the complexity of regular grammars. Nevertheless, sound change notation does differ in the scope and the rules for annotation. One notable difference is the possibility to explain how full classes of sounds change in a specific environment. The German rule of devoicing, for example, generally affects all voiced stops in the end of a word. As a result, one could also annotat it as G > K / _$, where G would denote the sounds [b, d, g] and K their counterparts [p, t, k]. Although we could easily write a single rule for each of the three phenomena here, the rule by which the sounds are grouped into two classes of voiced sounds and their unvoiced counterparts is linguistically more interesting, since it reminds us that the change by which word-final consonants loose the feature of voice is a systemic change, and not a phenomenon applying to some random selection of sounds in a given language.

The problem of this systemic annotation, however, is that the grouping of sounds into classes that change in a similar form is often language-specific. As a result, scholars have to propose new groupings whenever they deal with another language. Since neither the notation of sound values nor the symbols used to group sounds into classes are standardized, it is extremely difficult to compare different proposals made in the literature. As a result, any attempt to solve the problem of automatic sound law induction in historical linguistics would at the same time have to make strict proposals for a standardization of sound law notations used in our field. Standardization can thus be seen as one of the first major obstacles of solving this problem, with the problem of accounting for systemic aspects of sound change as the second one.

Beyond regular expressions

Even if we put the problem of inconsistent annotation and systemic changes to one side, the analogy with regular expressions cannot properly handle all aspects of sound change. When looking at the change from Middle Chinese to Mandarin Chinese, for example, we find a complex pattern, by which originally voiced sounds, like [b, d, g, dz] (among others), were either devoiced, becoming [p, t, k, ts], or devoiced and aspirated, becoming [pʰ, tʰ, kʰ, tsʰ]. While it is not uncommon that one sound can change into two variants, depending on the context in which it occurs, the Mandarin sound change in this case is interesting because the context is not a neighboring sound, but is instead the Middle Chinese tone for the syllable in question — syllables with a flat tone (called píng tone in classical terminology) are nowadays voiceless and aspirated, and syllables with one of the three remaining Middle Chinese tones (called shǎng, , and ) are nowadays plain voiceless (see List 2019: 157 for examples).

Since tone is a feature that applies to whole syllables, and not to single sound segments, we are dealing with so-called supra-segmental features here. As the meaning of the term supra-segmental indicates, the features in question cannot be represented as a sequence of sound, but need to be thought of as an additional layer, similar to other supra-segmental features in language, including stress, or juncture (indicating word or morpheme boundaries).

In contrast to sequences as we meet them in mathematics and informatics, linguistic sound sequences do not consist solely of letters drawn from an alphabet that is lined up in some unique order. They are instead often composed of multiple layers, which are in part hierarchically ordered. Words, morphemes, and phrases in linguistics are thus multi-layered constructs, which cannot be represented by one sequence alone, but could be more fruitfully thought of as the same as a partitura in music — the score of a piece of orchestra music, in which every voice of the orchestra is given its own sequence of sounds, and all different sequences are aligned with each other to form a whole.

img
The multi-layered character of sound sequences can be seen as similar to a partitura in musical notation.

This multi-layered character of sound sequences in spoken languages comprises a third complication for the task of automatic sound law induction. Finding the individual laws that trigger the change of one stage of a language to a later stage, cannot (always) be trivially reduced to the task of finding the finite state transducer that translates a set of input strings to a corresponding set of output strings. Since our input word forms in the proto-language are not simple strings, but rather an alignment of the different layers of a word form, a method to induce sound laws needs to be able to handle the multi-layered character of linguistic sequences.

Background for computational approaches to sound law induction

To my knowledge, the question of how to induce sound laws from data on proto- and descendant languages has barely been addressed. What comes closest to the problem are attempts to model sound change from known ancestral languages, such as Latin, to daughter languages, such as Spanish. This is reflected, for example, in the PHONO program (Hartmann 2003), where one can insert data for a proto-language along with a set of sound change rules (provided in a similar form to that mentioned above), which need to be given in a specific order, and are then checked to see whether they correctly predict the descendant forms.

For teaching purposes, I adapted a JavaScript version of a similar system, called the Sound Change Applier² (http://www.zompist.com/sca2.html) by Mark Rosenfelder from 2012, in which students could try to turn Old High German into modern German, by assigning simple rules as they are traditionally used to describe sound change processes in the linguistic literature. This adaptation (which can be found at http://dighl.github.io/sound_change/SoundChanger.html) compares the attested output with the output generated by a given set of rules, and provides some assessment of the general accuracy of the proposed set of rules. For example, when feeding the system the simple rule an > en /_#, which turns all final instances of -an into -en, 54 out of 517 Old High German words will yield the expected output in modern Standard German.

The problem with these endeavors is, of course, the handling of exceptions, along with the comparison of different proposals. Since we can think of an infinite number of rules by which we could successfully turn a certain amount of Old High German strings into Standard German strings, we would need to ask ourselves how we could evaluate different proposals. That some kind of parsimony should play a role here is obvious. However, it is by no means clear (at least to me) how to evaluate the complexity of two systems, since the complexity would not only be reflected in the number of rules, but also in the initial grouping of sounds to classes, which is commonly used to account for systemic aspects of sound change. A system accounting for the problem of sound law induction would try to automate the task of finding the set of rules. The fact that it is difficult even to compare two or more proposals based on human assessment further illustrates why I think that the problem is not trivial.

Another class of approaches is that of word prediction experiments, such as the one by Ciobanu and Dinu (2018) (but see also Bodt and List 2019), in which training data consisting of the source and the target language are used to create a model, which is then successively applied to new data, in order to test how well this model predicts target words from the source words. Since the model itself is not reported in these experiments, but only used in the form of a black box to predict new words, the task cannot be considered to be the same as the task for sound law induction — which I propose as one of my ten challenges for computational historical linguistics — given that we are interested in a method that explicitly returns the model, in order to allow linguists to inspect it.

Problems with the current solutions to sound law induction

Given that no real solutions exist to the problem up to now, it seems somewhat useless to point to the problems of current solutions. What I want to mention in this context, however, are the problems of the solutions presented for word prediction experiments, be they fed by manual data on sound changes (Hartmann 2003), or based on inference procedures (Ciobanu and Dinu 2018, Dekker 2018). Manual solutions like PHONO suffer from the fact that they are tedious to apply, given that linguists have to present all sound changes in their data in an ordered fashion, with the program converting them step by step, always turning the whole input sequence into an intermediate output sequence — the word prediction approaches thus suffer from limitations in feature design.

The method by Ciobanu and Dinu (2018), for example, is based on orthographic data alone, using the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm for sequence alignment (Needleman and Wunsch 1970); and the approach by Dekker (2018) only allows for the use for the limited alphabet of 40 symbols proposed by the ASJP project (Holman et al. 2008). In addition to the limited representation of linguistic sound sequences, be it by resorting to abstract orthography or to abstract reduced phonetic alphabets, none of the methods can handle those kinds of contexts which result from the multi-layered character of speech. Since we know well that these aspects are vital for certain phenomena of sound change, the methods exclude from the beginning an aspect that traditional historical linguists, who might be interested in an automatic solution to the sound law induction problem, would put at the top of their wish-list of what the algorithm should be able to handle.

Why is automatic sound law induction difficult?

The handling of supra-segmental contexts, mentioned above, is in my opinion also the reason why sound law induction is so difficult, not only for machines, but also for humans. I have so far mentioned three major problems as to why I think sound law induction is difficult. First, we face problems in defining the task properly in historical linguistics, due to a significant lack in standardization. This makes it difficult to decide on the exact output of a method for sound law induction. Second, we have problems in handling the systemic aspect of sound change properly. This does not apply only to automatic approaches, but also to the evaluation of different proposals for the same data proposed by humans. Third, the multi-layered character of speech requires an enhanced modeling of linguistic sequences, which cannot be modeled as mono-dimensional strings alone, but should rather be seen as alignments of different strings representing different layers (tonal layer, stress layer, sound layer, etc.).

How humans detect sound laws

There are only a few examples in the literature where scholars have tried to provide detailed lists of sound changes from proto- to descendant language (Baxter 1992, Newman 1999). Most examples of individual sound laws proposed in the literature are rarely even tested exhaustively on the data. As a result, it is difficult to assess what humans usually do in order to detect sound laws. What is clear is that historical linguists who have been working a lot on linguistic reconstruction tend to acquire a very good intuition that helps them to quickly check sound laws applied to word forms in their head, and to convert the output forms. This ability is developed in a learning-by-doing fashion, with no specific techniques ever being discussed in the classroom, which reflects the general tendency in historical linguistics to trust that students will learn how to become a good linguist from examples, sooner or later (Schwink 1994: 29). For this reason, it is difficult to take inspiration from current practice in historical linguistics, in order to develop computer-assisted approaches to solve this task.

Potential solutions to the problem

What can we do in order to address the problem of sound law induction in automatic frameworks in the future?

As a first step, we would have to standardize the notation system that we use to represent sound changes. This would need to come along with a standardized phonetic transcription system. Scholars often think that phonetic transcription is standardized in linguistics, specifically due to the use of the International Phonetic Alphabet. As our investigations into the actual application of the IPA have shown, however, the IPA cannot be seen as a standard, but rather as a set of recommendations that are often only loosely followed by linguists. First attempts to standardize phonetic transcription systems for the purpose of cross-linguistic applications have, however, been made, and will hopefully gain more acceptance in the future (Anderson et al. forthcoming, https://clts.clld.org).

As a second step, we should invest more time in investigating the systemic aspects of language change cross-linguistically. What I consider important in this context is the notion of distinctive features by which linguists try to group sounds into classes. Since feature systems proposed by linguists differ greatly, with some debate as to whether features are innate and the same for all languages, or instead language-specific (see Mielke 2008 for an overview on the problem), a first step would again consist of making the data comparable, rather than trying to decide in favour of one of the numerous proposals in the literature.

As a third step, we need to work on ways to account for the multi-layered aspect of sound sequences. Here, a first proposal, labelled "multi-tiered sequence representation", has already been made by myself (List and Chacon 2015), based on an idea that I had already used for the phonetic alignment algorithm proposed in my dissertation (List 2014), which itself goes back to the handling of hydrophilic sequences in ClustalW (Thompson et al. 1994). The idea is to define a sound sequence as a sequence of vectors, with each vector (called tier) representing one distinct aspect of the original word. As this representation allows for an extremely flexible modeling of context — which would just consist of an arbitrary number of vector dimensions that could account for aspects such as tone, stress, preceding or following sounds — this representation would allow us to treat words as sequences of sounds while at the same time accounting for their multi-layered structure. Although there remain many unsolved aspects on how to exploit this specific model for phonetic sequences to induce sound laws from ancestor-descendant data, I consider this to be a first step in the direction of a solution to the problem.

Multi-tiered sequence representation for a fictive word in Middle Chinese.

Outlook

Although it is not necessarily recognized by the field as a real problem of historical linguistics, I consider the problem of automatic sound law induction as a very important problem for our field. If we could infer sound laws from a set of proposed proto-forms and a set of descendant forms, then we could use them to test the quality of the proto-forms themselves, by inspecting the sound laws proposed by a given system. We could also compare sound laws across different language families to see whether we find cross-linguistic tendencies.

Having inferred enough cross-linguistic data on sound laws represented in unified models for sound law notation, we could also use the rules to search for cognate words that have so far been ignored. There is a lot to do, however, until we reach this point. Starting to think about automatic, and also manual, induction of sound laws as a specific task in computational historical linguistics can be seen as a first step in this direction.

References
Anderson, Cormac and Tresoldi, Tiago and Chacon, Thiago Costa and Fehn, Anne-Maria and Walworth, Mary and Forkel, Robert and List, Johann-Mattis (forthcoming) A Cross-Linguistic Database of Phonetic Transcription Systems. Yearbook of the Poznań Linguistic Meeting, pp 1-27.

Baxter, William H. (1992) A handbook of Old Chinese Phonology. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Bodt, Timotheus A. and List, Johann-Mattis (2019) Testing the predictive strength of the comparative method: An ongoing experiment on unattested words in Western Kho-Bwa langauges. 1-22. [Preprint, under review, not peer-reviewed]

Ciobanu, Alina Maria and Dinu, Liviu P. (2018) Simulating language evolution: A tool for historical linguistics. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Computational Linguistics: System Demonstrations, pp 68-72.

Dekker, Peter (2018) Reconstructing Language Ancestry by Performing Word Prediction with Neural Networks. University of Amsterdam: Amsterdam.

Hall, T. Alan (2000) Phonologie: Eine Einführung. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

Hartmann, Lee (2003) Phono. Software for modeling regular historical sound change. In: Actas VIII Simposio Internacional de Comunicación Social. Southern Illinois University, pp 606-609.

Holman, Eric W. and Wichmann, Søren and Brown, Cecil H. and Velupillai, Viveka and Müller, André and Bakker, Dik (2008) Explorations in automated lexicostatistics. Folia Linguistica 20.3: 116-121.

List, Johann-Mattis (2014) Sequence Comparison in Historical Linguistics. Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press.

List, Johann-Mattis and Chacon, Thiago (2015) Towards a cross-linguistic database for historical phonology? A proposal for a machine-readable modeling of phonetic context. Paper, presented at the workshop Historical Phonology and Phonological Theory [organized as part of the 48th annual meeting of the SLE] (2015/09/04, Leiden, Societas Linguistica Europaea).

List, Johann-Mattis (2019) Automatic inference of sound correspondence patterns across multiple languages. Computational Linguistics 1.45: 137-161.

Mielke, Jeff (2008) The Emergence of Distinctive Features. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Needleman, Saul B. and Wunsch, Christan D. (1970) A gene method applicable to the search for similarities in the amino acid sequence of two proteins. Journal of Molecular Biology 48: 443-453.

Newman, John and Raman, Anand V. (1999) Chinese Historical Phonology: Compendium of Beijing and Cantonese Pronunciations of Characters and their Derivations from Middle Chinese. München: LINCOM Europa.

Schwink, Frederick (1994) Linguistic Typology, Universality and the Realism of Reconstruction. Washington: Institute for the Study of Man.

Thompson, J. D. and Higgins, D. G. and Gibson, T. J. (1994) CLUSTAL W: Improving the sensitivity of progressive multiple sequence alignment through sequence weighting, position-specific gap penalties and weight matrix choice. Nucleic Acids Research 22: 4673–4680.

Monday, December 31, 2018

Patterns, processes, abduction, and consilience


In a recent blog post, David emphasized how important it is to distinguish patterns from processes in evolutionary biology, with phylogenetic analysis concentrating on the description of patterns (and not on the direct investigation of processes. David's major point is that we need to be careful to not forget about the logical limitations of our approaches:
In the world of logic, propositions cannot be converted; and yet converting propositions is exactly what is done by all descriptive data analyses.
As David correctly points out, in phylogenetic analysis, we tend to observe a pattern (some similarity between different species or languages, for example), and use this pattern to conclude that a specific process has happened (eg. the languages are so similar that we think they are identical).

Given that this problem is also important in historical linguistics, I want to share some thoughts from a linguistic perspective. Most of these were elaborated much earlier, in my PhD dissertation; and if you have read the original chapter (List 2014: 51-57), what I write below may seem repetitive. I have also alluded to these ideas in a couple of previous posts: What we know, what we know we can know, and what we know we cannot know; and Killer arguments and the nature of proof in historical sciences.

However, it is worthwhile to elaborate on these thoughts here, as David's comments are extremely interesting for historical sciences in general, and I think they deserve a more proper discussion across different disciplines.

Ontological fact and epistemological reality

The basic pattern/process problem may be even more complex than it is in evolutionary biology. In quite a few branches of science, most prominently in the historical and social sciences, even the object of investigation is not directly accessible to the researcher. All researchers can do is to try to infer the research object with the help of tests. In historiography we infer the res gestae by comparing direct and indirect (usually written) sources (Schmitter 1982: 55f). In psychology, attributes of people, such as "intelligence" cannot (yet) be directly measured but have to be inferred by measuring how they are "reflected in test performance" (Cronbach and Meehl 1955: 178).

The same holds for ancestors in historical linguistics and evolutionary biology. All we can do in order to examine whether some languages or species share a specific kind of ancestry is comparing them systematically, trying to identify patterns that provide evidence for close relationship. Given that we lack direct evidence of its existence, the ancestral languages or species we infer through comparison cannot be treated like an ontological fact but only as an epistemological reality (Kormišin 1988: 92). We address what psychologists call the construct, that is, the "fiction or story put forward by a theorist to make sense of a phenomenon" (Statt 1981/1998), not the "real" object.

Abduction as our sole mode of logical reasoning

In historical linguistics, we can address our research objects only via constructs, and so we have to rely on abduction as our sole mode of logical reasoning (Anttila 1972: 196f). The term abduction was originally coined by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and refers, as opposed to induction and deduction, to a "mode of reasoning [...] in which rather than progressing 'logically' [...], one infers an antecedent condition by heuristic guessing from a present case" (Lass 1997: 334). In Peirce's word:
Accepting the conclusion that an explanation is needed when facts contrary to what we should expect emerge, it follows that the explanation must be such a proposition as would lead to the prediction of the observed facts, either as necessary consequences or at least as very probable under the circumstances. A hypothesis then, has to be adopted, which is likely in itself, and renders the facts likely. This step of adopting a hypothesis as being suggested by the facts, is what I call abduction. I reckon it as a form of inference, however problematical the hypothesis may be held. (Peirce 1931/1958: 7.202)
Due to the specific aspects of knowledge we are given in the historical sciences, abduction is the only mode of reasoning that we can employ. According to Peirce (ibid.: 2.623), all three modes of reasoning, induction, deduction, and abduction, "involve the triad of 'rule', 'case' and 'result', but inference moves in different directions" (Lass 1997: 334). While induction infers a rule from a situation in which one is given case (initial situation) and result, deduction infers a result from a situation in which one is given case and a rule. Abduction, however, starts from a result (or a pattern in David's words) and a rule from which we try to infer a case.

As an example, consider the problem of language evolution. Given two languages with no written records of their previous history, we may observe as a pattern (or result) that they show striking systematic regularities in terms of sound correspondences. Given that we know, that — as a rule — languages change their sound systems slowly over time, we can conclude that the initial situation, the case, was that the two languages were once a single language. There is no way we employ any other mode of reasoning here, as long as we start from individual languages (or species) whose past we want to understand and describe.

We can think of situations in which we try to induce rules in historical linguistics, for example, when dealing with the development from Latin into its descendant languages, where we could ask about the individual processes of sound change (or sound change rules) by which the former was transformed into the latter. We can also think of situations in which we try to decide results from rules and initial situations, for example when trying to predict unobserved cognate words in languages that have not yet been completely documented by fieldwork (Bodt et al. 2018), by applying rules of sound change (or sound correspondences) to aligned cognate sets (List, forthcoming). But the big bulk of our work in historical linguistics (and also in evolutionary biology) works only via abduction: given a result (a pattern / observation in the present), we use our knowledge of rules and processes to infer an ancestral state.


Problems of reasoning based on abduction

According to Schurz (2008), different patterns of abduction can be distinguished, depending on: (1) "the kind of hypothesis which is abduced", (2) "the kind of evidence which the abduction intends to explain", and (3) "the beliefs or cognitive mechanisms which drive the abduction" (ibid.: 205). The kind of abduction that is commonly used in historical linguistics and evolutionary biology belongs to the family of factual abductions, that is, abductions in which "both the evidence to be explained and the abduced hypothesis are singular facts" (ibid.: 206). Since we mainly deal with unobservable facts (ie. constructs), we can further characterize it as historical-fact abduction (ibid.: 209).

The problem of historical-fact abduction is not necessarily that what we are try to "observe" lies in the past, but more importantly, that — due to the logic underlying abduction as a mode of reasoning — we usually have to infer both the rules and the initial situation from the patterns we observe. Given (as David emphasized) that a pattern can result from different processes, our inference of a specific, individual historical fact requires that we decide on a specific, individual process at the same time. Given that we have to infer both the process and initial state at the same time, it is not surprising that our inferences about the past are often so vague, and may easily change so quickly, specifically in a situation where we can't just travel back in time to see whether we were right.

In contrast to David, who suggested that we cannot directly investigate processes in the evolutionary sciences, however, I think that in we still can indirectly, be it with help of experiments, with simulations, or in those cases where we are lucky enough to find history documented in sources. These cases where we can study processes, however, are — and here I agree completely with David — not what we normally do in our research. What we usually do is investigating patterns and trying to infer both the process and the original state by which the patterns can be explained.

Cumulative evidence

The problem of abduction, in general (or historical-fact abduction, in specific), is to make sure that we protect ourselves from giving in to wild speculations. That we are not necessarily good at doing so is reflected in the numerous debates in historical linguistics, and evolutionary biology, where scholars at times invoke completely contrary scenarios explaining the past based on identical patterns. In addition, in historical linguistics, people often do not even agree regarding the patterns they believe can be observed in the data.

Earlier, in my dissertation (List 2014), I identified two aspects that I deem important in order to minimize the speculative aspect of our research, claiming that historical-fact abduction should be based on: (1) unique hypotheses, and (2) cumulative evidence. That we need unique hypotheses may seem self-evident at first sight, since it seems to be silly to claim that a certain pattern could be explained by a range of processes. Looking back at this point now, however, I tend to see this less strictly. In fact, I think that I would even prefer it if scholars would list all potential (individual) processes that may seem likely to have yielded a pattern, instead of focusing only on one possibility (and disregarding alternative solutions). Since we are not doctors who need to heal our patients as quickly as possible, we can afford a certain amount of doubt in our research.

Regarding the second point, what I had in mind earlier was that it is best if we have multiple results or different patterns (observed for the same species or languages under investigation) that can all be explained by the same hypothesis. In order to justify the claim that one specific hypothesis explains the evidence better than any alternative hypotheses, we can profit from combining multiple pieces of evidence that might "[fall] short of proof [when taking] each item separately" but become convincing when "all the items [are] combined" (Sturtevant 1920: 11).

Being forced to rely on multiple pieces of evidence (that only when taken together allow one to draw a rather convincing picture of the past) is not a unique problem of historical linguistics and evolutionary biology, but also of historiography – and even crime investigations, as was pointed out by Georg von der Gabelentz (1840-1893, cf. Gabelentz 1891: 154), and in later work on semiotics (cf. the papers in Eco and Sebeok 1983). The fact that historical linguistics theories are built about cases (events, unique objects), as opposed to theories about general laws, may also be the reason for the philological "style" prevalent in historical linguistic studies. I also believe that it is due to the complex nature of the inference process that a systematization of our methods has never been carried out efficiently.

While, for example, we can claim (at least to some degree) that the identification of cognate words in historical linguistics can be systematized (and even to some extent automatized, List et al. 2017), we are at a loss when it comes to systematizing the methods that we use to determine whether words have been borrowed or not. Instead of using one single method, we use a whole range of indicators, and only take borrowings for granted if at least a few of them point into the same direction (List 2018).

Consilience and conclusion

In a talk by James McInerney, held in 2015 in Paris (presenting an overview of his research as reflected in part in McInerney et al. 2014), I realized that the question of "cumulative evidence", which I had thought would have been discussed only in linguistic circles, belongs to a larger complex of discussions about consilience, as opposed to the Popperian tradition that claims that knowledge in science can only advance via falsification and the identification of general laws, as opposed to singular facts (Popper 1945: Chapter 25:II). We find this view, that we need to employ cumulative evidence when trying to infer individual facts, clearly stated in the work of William Whewell (1794-1866), who originally introduced the term consilience:
The Consilience of Inductions [ie. abductions] takes place when an Induction obtained from one class of facts, coincides with an Induction, obtained from another different class. This Consilience is a test of the truth of the Theory in which it occurs. (Whewell 1840: 469)
As far as I understand from James McInerney's talk, the idea of consilience has long been disregarded in the historical sciences but is now gaining popularity (also thanks to the influential book by Wilson 1998). Although at first I felt delighted when I realized that I was not alone with the problem that I had called "cumulative evidence", based on the old book by Sturtevant (1920), I have to admit that I still do not really know what to do with this information, as it is extremely hard to operationalize the concept of consilience. When confronted with numerous different pieces of evidence, how can we identify the hypothesis that explains them all? How can we compare two opposing hypotheses that each convincingly explain some but not all the data? How can we arrive at an objective weighting of our evidence, based on its importance?

What is clear to me is that a "probabilistic evaluation of causes and elimination of implausible causes plays a central role in factual abductions" (Schurz 2008: 207), since it reduces the search space when seeking an explanation for a given phenomenon (ibid.: 210f). But it is not clear how to arrive at such an evaluation when dealing with patterns in practice. For the time being, thinking and discussing about consilience seems interesting; but until we find ways to operationalize it, it will just remain a nice idea without any concrete value for our scientific endeavors. I dearly hope that this won't be the case.

References
Anttila, R. (1972) An introduction to historical and comparative linguistics. Macmillan: New York.

Bodt, T., N. Hill, and J.-M. List (2018) Prediction experiment for missing words in Kho-Bwa language data. Open Science Framework Preregistrations .evcbp., 7 pp. [Preprint, under review, not peer-reviewed]

Cronbach, L. and P. Meehl (1955) Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological Bulletin 52: 281-302.

Eco, U. and T. Sebeok (1983) The sign of three. Indiana University Press: Bloomington.

Gabelentz, H. (1891) Die Sprachwissenschaft. Ihre Aufgaben, Methoden und bisherigen Ergebnisse. T.O. Weigel: Leipzig.

Kormišin, I. (1988) Prajazyk. Bližnjaja i dal’njaja rekonstrukcija [The proto-language. Narrow and distant reconstruction]. In: Gadžieva, N. (ed.) Sravnitel’no-istoričeskoe izučenie jazykov raznych semejTeorija lingvističeskoj rekonstrukcii [Theory of linguistic reconstruction]. 3. Nauka: Moscow, pp. 90-105.

Lass, R. (1997) Historical linguistics and language change. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

List, J.-M. (2014) Sequence comparison in historical linguistics. Düsseldorf University Press: Düsseldorf.

List, J.-M., S. Greenhill, and R. Gray (2017) The potential of automatic word comparison for historical linguistics. PLOS One 12: 1-18.

List, J.-M. (2018) Automatic methods for the investigation of language contact situations. [Preprint, under review, not peer-reviewed]. URL: http://lingulist.de/documents/papers/list-2018-automatic-methods-for-the-investigation-of-language-contact.pdf

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