Showing posts with label Proof. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Proof. Show all posts
Monday, August 26, 2019
Statistical proof of language relatedness (Open problems in computational diversity linguistics 7)
The more I advance with the problems I want to present during this year, the more I have to admit to myself, sometimes, that the problem I planned to present is so difficult that I find it even hard to simply present the state-of-the-art. The problem of this month, problem number 7 in my list, is such an example — proving that two or more languages are "genetically related", as historical linguists (incorrectly) tend to say, is not only hard, it is also extremely difficult even to summarize the topic properly.
Typically, colleagues start with the famous but also not very helpful quote of Sir William Jones, who delivered a report to the British Indian Company, thereby mentioning that there might be a deeper relationship between Sanskrit and some European languages (like Greek and Latin). The article, titled The third anniversary discourse, delivered 2 February, 1786, by the president (published in 1798) has by now been quoted so many times that it is better to avoid quoting it another time (but you will find the full quote with references in my reference library.
In contrast to later scholars like Jacob Grimm and Rasmus Rask, however, Jones does not prove anything, he just states an opinion. The reason why scholars like to quote him, is that he seems to talk about probability, since he mentions the impossibility that the resemblances between the languages he observed could have arisen by chance. Since a great deal of the discussion about language relationship centers around the question how chance could be controlled for, it is a welcome quote from the olden times to be used when writing a paper on statistics or quantitative methods. But this does not necessarily mean that Jones really knew what he was writing about, as one can read in detail in the very interesting book by Campbell and Poser (2008), which deals at length with the supposedly overrated role that William Jones played in the early history of historical linguistics.
Macro Families
Returning to the topic at hand. The regularity of sound change and the possibility to prove language relationship in some cases was an unexpected detection of some linguists during the early 19th century, but what many linguists have been dreaming about since is to expand their methods to such a degree that even deeper relationships could be proven. While the evidence for the relationship of the core Indo-European languages was more or less convincing by itself (as rightfully pointed out by Nichols 1996), scholars have proposed many suggestions of relationship, many of which are no longer followed by the communis opinio. Among these long-range proposals for deep phylogenetic relations are theories that further unite fully established language families, proposing large macro-families — such as Nostratic (uniting Semitic, Indo-European, and many more, depending on the respective version), Altaic (uniting Turkic, Mongolic, Tungusic, Japanese, and Korean, etc.), or Dene-Caucasian (uniting Sino-Tibetan, North Caucasian, and Na-Dene), which span incredibly large areas on earth.
Given that it the majority of scholars mistrust these new and risky proposals, and that even scholars who work in the field of long-range comparison often disagree with each other, it is not surprising that at least some linguists became interested in the question of how long-range relationship could be proven in the end. One of the first attempts in this regard was presented by Aharon Dolgopolsky, a convinced Nostratic linguist, who presented a first, very interesting, heuristic procedure to determine deep cognates and deep language relationships, by breaking sounds down to more abstract classes, in order to address the problem that words often do no longer look similar due to sound change (Dolgopolsky 1964).
Why it is hard to prove language relationship
Dolgopolsky did not use any statistics to prove his approach, but he emphasized the probabilistic aspect of his endeavor, and derived his "consonant classes" or "sound classes" as well as his very short list of stable concepts from the empirical investigation of a large corpus. The core of his approach, to fix a list of semantic items, presumably "stable" (i.e. slowly changing with respect to semantic shift), and to reduce the complexity of phonetic transcriptions to a core meta-alphabet, has been the basis of many follow-up studies that follow an explicitly quantitative (or statistic) approach.
As of now, most scholars, be they classical or computational, agree that the first stage of historical language comparison consists of the proof that the languages one wants to investigate are, indeed, historically related to each other (for the underlying workflow of historical language comparison, see Ross and Durie). In a blogpost published much earlier (Monogenesis, polygenesis, and militant agnosticism I have already pointed to this problem, as it is quite different from biology, where independent evolution of life is usually not assumed by scholars, while linguistic research can never really exclude it.
While proving language relationship of closely related languages is often a complete no-brainer, it becomes especially then hard, when exceeding some critical time depth. Where this time depth lies is not clear by now, but based on our observations regarding the paste in which languages replace existing words with new ones, borrow words, or loose and build grammatical structures, it is clear that it is theoretically possible that a language group could have lost all hints on its ancestry after 5,000 to 10,000 years. Luckily, what is theoretically possible for one language, does not necessarily happen with all languages in a given sample, and as a result, we find still enough signal for ancestral languages in quite a few language families of the world, that allows us to draw conclusions that go back about 10,000 years in the most cases, if not even deeper in some cases.
Traditional insights into the proof of language relationships
The difficulty of the task is probably obvious without further explanation — the more material a language acquires from its neighbors, and the more it loses or modifies the material it inherited from its ancestors, the more difficult it is for the experts to find the evidence that convinces their colleagues about the phylogenetic affiliation of such a language. While regular sound changes can easily convince people of phylogenetic relationship, the evidence that scholars propose for deeper linguistic groupings is rarely large enough to establish correspondences.
As a result, scholars often resort to other types of evidence, such as certain grammatical peculiarities, certain similarities in the pronunciation of certain words, or external findings (e.g.,from archaeology). As Handel (2008) points out, for example, a good indicator of a Sino-Tibetan language is that its words for five, I, and fish start with similar initial sounds and contain a similar vowel (compare Chinese wǔ, wǒ, and yú, going back to MC readings ŋjuX. ŋaX, and ŋjo). While these arguments are often intuitively very convincing (and may also be statistically convincing, as Nichols 1996 argues), this kind of evidence, as mentioned by Handel, is extremely difficult to detect, since the commonalities can be found in so many different regions of a human language system.
While linguists also use sound correspondences to prove and establish relationship, there are no convincing cases known to me in which sound correspondences were employed to prove relationships beyond a certain time depth. One can compare this endeavor to some degree with the work of police commissars who have to find a murderer, and can do so easily if the person responsible left DNA at the spot, while they have to spend many nights in pubs, drinking cheap beer and smoking bad cigarettes, in order to wait for the spark of inspiration that delivers the ultimate proof not based on DNA.
Computational and statistical approaches
Up to now, no computational methods are available to find signals of the kind presented by Handel for Sino-Tibetan, i.e, a general-purpose heuristic to search for what Nichols (1996) calls individual-identifying evidence. So,computational and statistical methods have so far been based on very schematic approaches, which are almost exclusively based on wordlists. A wordlist can hereby be thought of as a simple table with a certain number of concepts (arm, hand, stone, cinema) in the first column, and translation equivalents for these concepts being listed for several different languages in the following columns (see List 2014: 22-24). This format can of course be enhanced (Forkel et al. 2018), but it represents the standard way in which many historical linguists still prepare and curate their data.
What scholars now try to do is to see if they can find some kind of signal in the data that they think would be unlikely to be detected by chance. In general, there are two ways that scholars have explored so far. In the approach proposed by Ringe (1992), the signalsthat are tested for in the wordlists are sound correspondences, and we can therefore call theses approaches correspondence-based approaches to prove language relationship. In the approach of Baxter and Manaster Ramer (2000), which follows the original idea of Dolgopolsky, the data are converted to sound classes first, and cognacy is assumed for words with identical sound classes. Sound-class-based approaches again try to illustrate that the matches that can be identified are unlikely to be due to chance.
Both approaches have been discussed in quite a range of different papers, and scholars have also tried to propose improvements to the methods. Ringe's correspondence-based approach showed that it can become difficult to prove the relationship of languages formally, although we have very good reasons to assume it based on our standard methods. Baxter and Manaster Ramer (2000) presented a more optimistic case study, in which they argue that their sound-class-based approach would allow them to argue in favor of the relationship of Hindi and English, even if the two languages are separated by at least 10,000 or even more years.
A general problem of Ringe's approach was that he tried to use combinatorics to arrive at his statistical evaluation. This is similar to the way in which Henikoff and Henikoff (1992) developed their BLOSUM matrices for biology, by assuming that the only factor that handles the combination of amino acids in biological sequences is their frequency. Ringe tried to estimate the likelihood of finding matches of word-initial consonants in his data by using a combinatorial approach based on the assumption of simple sound frequencies in the word lists he investigated. The general problem with linguistic sequences, however, is that they are not randomly arranged. Instead, every language has its own system of phonotactic rules, a rather simple grammar that restricts certain letter combinations and favors others. All spoken languages have these systems, and some vary greatly with respect to their phonotactics. As a result, due to the inherent structure of sequences, a bag of symbols approach, as used by Ringe, can have unwanted side effects and invoke misleading estimates regarding the probability of certain matches.
To avoid this problem, Kessler (2001) proposed the use of permutation tests, by which the random distribution, against which the attested distribution is compared, is generated via the shuffling of the lists. Instead of comparing translations for "apple" in one language with translations for "apple" in another language, one compares now translations for pear with translations for "apple", hoping that this — if done often enough — better approximates the random distribution (i.e. the situation in which one compares several known unrelated languages with similar phoneme inventories).
Permutation is also the standard in all sound-correspondence-based approaches. In a recent paper, Kassian et al. (2015) used these approaches (first proposed by Turchin et al. 2010) to argue for the relationship of Indo-European and Uralic languages by comparing reconstructed word lists for Proto-Indo-European and Proto-Uralic. As can be seen from the discussion of these findings involving multiple authors, people are still not automatically convinced by a significance test, and scholars have criticized: their choice of test concepts (they used the classical 110-item list by Yakhontov and Starostin), their choice of reconstruction system (they did not use the mysterious laryngeals in their comparison), and the possibility that the findings were due to other factors (early borrowing).
While there have been some more attempts to improve the correspondence-based and the sound-class-based approaches (e.g., Kessler 2007, Kilani 2015, Mortarino 2009), it is unlikely that they will lead to the consolidation of contested proposals on macro families any time soon. Apart from the general problems of many of the current tests, there seem to be too many unknowns that prevent the community to accept findings, no matter "how" significant they appear. As can be nicely seen from the reaction to the paper by Kassian et al. 2015, a significant test will first raise the typical questions regarding the quality of the data and the initial judgments (which may also at times be biased). Even if all scholars would agree in this case, however, i.e. if one could not criticize anything in the initial test setting, there would still be the possibility to say that the findings reflect early language contact instead of phylogenetic relatedness.
Initial ideas for improvement
What I find unsatisfying about most existing tests is that they do not make exhaustive use of alignment methods. The sound-class-based approach is a shortcut for alignments, but it reduces words to two consonant classes only, and requires an extensive analysis of the words to compare only the root morpheme. It therefore also opens the possibility to bias the results (even if scholars may not intend that directly). While correspondence-based tests are much more elegant in general, they avoid alignments completely, and just pick the first letter in every word. The problem seems to be that — even when using permutations to generate the random distribution — nobody really knows how one should score the significance of sound correspondences in aligned words. I have to admit that I do not know it either. Although the tools for automated sequence comparison that my colleagues and I have been developing in the past (List 2014, List et al. 2018) seem like the best starting point to improve the correspondence-based approach, it is not clear how the test should be performed in the end.
Additionally, I assume also that expanded, fully fledged, tests will ultimately show what I reported back in my dissertation — if we work on limited wordlists, with only 200 items per language, the test will drastically lose its power when certain time depths have been reached. While we can easily prove the relationship of English and German, even with only 100 words, we have a hard time doing the same thing for English and Albanian (see List 2014: 200-203). But expanding the wordlists bears another risk for comparison (as pointed out to me by George Starostin): the more words we add, the more likely it is that they have been borrowed. Thus, we face a general dilemma in historical linguistics: that we are forced to deal with sparse data, since languages tend to lose their historical signal rather quickly.
Outlook
While there is no doubt that it would be attractive to have a test that would immediately tell one whether languages are related or not, I am becoming more and more skeptical about whether this test would actually help us, specifically when concentrating on pairwise tests alone. The challenge of this problem is not just to design a test that makes sense and does not overly simplify. The challenge is to propagate the test in such a way that it convinces our colleagues that it really works. This, however, is a challenge that is greater than any of the other open problems I have discussed so far in this year.
References
Baxter, William H. and Manaster Ramer, Alexis (2000) Beyond lumping and splitting: Probabilistic issues in historical linguistics. In: Renfrew, Colin and McMahon, April and Trask, Larry (eds.) Time Depth in Historical Linguistics. Cambridge:McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, pp. 167-188.
Campbell, Lyle and Poser, William John (2008) Language Classification: History and Method. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Dolgopolsky, Aron B. (1964) Gipoteza drevnejšego rodstva jazykovych semej Severnoj Evrazii s verojatnostej točky zrenija [A probabilistic hypothesis concering the oldest relationships among the language families of Northern Eurasia]. Voprosy Jazykoznanija 2: 53-63.
Forkel, Robert and List, Johann-Mattis and Greenhill, Simon J. and Rzymski, Christoph and Bank, Sebastian and Cysouw, Michael and Hammarström, Harald and Haspelmath, Martin and Kaiping, Gereon A. and Gray, Russell D. (2018) Cross-linguistic data formats, advancing data sharing and re-use in comparative linguistics. Scientific Data 5: 1-10.
Handel, Zev (2008) What is Sino-Tibetan? Snapshot of a field and a language family in flux. Language and Linguistics Compass 2: 422-441.
Henikoff, Steven and Henikoff, Jorja G. (1992) Amino acid substitution matrices from protein blocks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 89: 10915-10919.
Jones, William (1798) The third anniversary discourse, delivered 2 February, 1786, by the president. On the Hindus. Asiatick Researches 1: 415-43.
Kassian, Alexei and Zhivlov, Mikhail and Starostin, George S. (2015) Proto-Indo-European-Uralic comparison from the probabilistic point of view. The Journal of Indo-European Studies 43: 301-347.
Kessler, Brett (2001) The Significance of Word Lists. Statistical Tests for Investigating Historical Connections Between Languages. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Kessler, Brett (2007) Word similarity metrics and multilateral comparison. In: Proceedings of Ninth Meeting of the ACL Special Interest Group in Computational Morphology and Phonology, pp. 6-14.
Kilani, Marwan (2015): Calculating false cognates: An extension of the Baxter & Manaster-Ramer solution and its application to the case of Pre-Greek. Diachronica 32: 331-364.
List, Johann-Mattis (2014) Sequence Comparison in Historical Linguistics. Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press.
List, Johann-Mattis and Walworth, Mary and Greenhill, Simon J. and Tresoldi, Tiago and Forkel, Robert (2018) Sequence comparison in computational historical linguistics. Journal of Language Evolution 3: 130–144.
Mortarino, Cinzia (2009) An improved statistical test for historical linguistics. Statistical Methods and Applications 18: 193-204.
Nichols, Johanna (1996) The comparative method as heuristic. In: Durie, Mark (ed.) The Comparative Method Reviewed. New York:Oxford University Press, pp. 39-71.
Ringe, Donald A. (1992) On calculating the factor of chance in language comparison. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 82: 1-110.
Ross, Malcolm D. (1996) Contact-induced change and the comparative method. Cases from Papua New Guinea. In: Durie, Mark (ed.) The Comparative Method Reviewed. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 180-217.
Turchin, Peter and Peiros, Ilja and Gell-Mann, Murray (2010) Analyzing genetic connections between languages by matching consonant classes. Journal of Language Relationship 3: 117-126.
Tuesday, May 30, 2017
Killer arguments and the nature of proof in historical sciences
Some long time ago, somebody told me this joke, which I just found again on the internet in an English version (following jokes.cc.com, with modifications based on my memory):
We often face similar situations in the historical sciences where we seek some kind of true story behind a couple of facts, when we are given external evidence that is just pointing to the right answer, or — let's be careful — the most probable answer, independent of where the other evidence might point to. We can think of similar situations in crime investigations, where we may think that a large body of evidence convicts some person as a murderer until we see some video proof that reveals the real offender.
That crime investigations have a lot in common with research in the historical sciences has been noted before by many people, notably the famous Umberto Eco (1932-2016), who edited a whole anthology on the role of circumstantial evidence in linguistics, semiotics, and philosophy (Eco and Sebeok 1983) where scholars compared the work of Sherlock Holmes with the work of people in the historical sciences. What Sherlock Holmes and historical linguists (and also evolutionary biologists) have in common is the use of abduction as their fundamental mode of reasoning. The term itself goes back to Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), who distinguished it from deduction and induction:
As do medical practitioners or crime investigators, we have our general schema, our protocol, which we use to carry out our investigations. Biologists search for similar DNA sequences, linguists look for similar sound sequences. In most cases, this works fine, although we are usually left with uncertainties and things that do not really seem to add up. As long as we can quietly follow the protocol, we are fine; and even if the results of our research do not necessarily last for a long time, being superceded by more recent research, we usually have the impression that we did the best we could, given the complex circumstances with their complex circumstancial evidence. But once in a while, we uncover evidence similar to video proofs in crime investigation, or wedding rings as in the Little Johnny joke — evidence that is so striking that we have to put our protocol to one side and just accept that there is only one solution, no matter what the rest of our evidence or our protocol might point to.
In 1879, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) predicted two consonantal sounds in Proto-Indo-European based on circumstantial evidence (Saussure 1879). In 1927, Jerzy Kuryłowicz (1895-1978) could show that one of the sounds was still pronounced in Hittite, an Indo-European language that was not known during Saussure's time (Lehmann 1992: 33), and had just been deciphered. While Saussure followed protocol in his investigation, Kuryłowicz provided the video proof, and only since then, Saussure's hypothesis has become communis opinio in historical linguistics.
I assume that nobody will doubt the existence of different kinds of proof, different qualities of proof, in historical disciplines. If we are left with nothing else but our protocol, we can derive certain conclusions, but we can easily abandon our protocol once we have been presented with those killer arguments, that specific kind of proof that is so striking that we do not need to bother to have a look at any alternative facts again. I do not know of any similar examples in biology, but in linguistics (and in crime investigation, at least judging from the criminal novels I have read), it is obvious that our evidence cannot only be ranked, but that we also have a huge incline between the standard evidence we use to make most of our arguments and those killer arguments that are so striking that no doubt is left.
In the short story The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, Sherlock Holmes says:
Teacher: "Four crows are on the fence. The farmer shoots one. How many are left?"Given the title of this post, you may wonder why I tell you that joke. The reason is that for me, the essence of the joke is expressing the situation we often have in the historical sciences when we talk about "proof", be it of the closer relationship of different species, or the ultimate relationship of languages. Given the evidence we are given, we can reach an awful lot of conclusions in order to arrive at a convincing story, but if we see the wedding ring on somebody's hand, we know the true story no matter what other evidence we are given. The wedding ring in the joke serves as a killer argument — no matter what other evidence we consider, it is much more likely that the person who is married is the one with the ring than anybody else.
Little Johnny: "None."
Teacher: "Listen carefully: Four crows are on the fence. The farmer shoots one. How many are left?"
Little Johnny: "None."
Teacher: "Can you explain that answer?"
Little Johnny: "One is shot, the others fly away. There are none left."
Teacher: "Well, that isn't the correct answer, but I like the way you think."
Little Johnny: "Teacher, can I ask a question?"
Teacher: "Sure."
Little Johnny: "There are three women in the park. The first one reads a love novel, the second one reads the newspaper, and the third one updates her FaceBook profile, which one of them is married?"
Teacher: "The one reading the newspaper?"
Little Johnny: "No. The one with the wedding ring on, but I like the way you think."
We often face similar situations in the historical sciences where we seek some kind of true story behind a couple of facts, when we are given external evidence that is just pointing to the right answer, or — let's be careful — the most probable answer, independent of where the other evidence might point to. We can think of similar situations in crime investigations, where we may think that a large body of evidence convicts some person as a murderer until we see some video proof that reveals the real offender.
That crime investigations have a lot in common with research in the historical sciences has been noted before by many people, notably the famous Umberto Eco (1932-2016), who edited a whole anthology on the role of circumstantial evidence in linguistics, semiotics, and philosophy (Eco and Sebeok 1983) where scholars compared the work of Sherlock Holmes with the work of people in the historical sciences. What Sherlock Holmes and historical linguists (and also evolutionary biologists) have in common is the use of abduction as their fundamental mode of reasoning. The term itself goes back to Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), who distinguished it from deduction and induction:
Accepting the conclusion that an explanation is needed when facts contrary to what we should expect emerge, it follows that the explanation must be such a proposition as would lead to the prediction of the observed facts, either as necessary consequences or at least as very probable under the circumstances. A hypothesis then, has to be adopted, which is likely in itself, and renders the facts likely. This step of adopting a hypothesis as being suggested by the facts, is what I call abduction. I reckon it as a form of inference, however problematical the hypothesis may be held. (Peirce 1931/1958: 7.202)Our problem in the historical sciences is that we are searching an original situation: what was the case a long time ago, based on general knowledge about (evolutionary or historical) processes and the results of this situation. When Sherlock Holmes looks at a crime scene, he sees the results of an action and uses his knowledge of human behaviour to find the one who was responsible for the crime. When doctors listen to the heartbeat of patients who are short of breath, they try to find out what causes their disease by making use of their knowledge about symptoms and the diseases that could have caused them. When linguists look at words from different languages, they make use of their knowledge of processes of language change and language contact in order to work out why those languages are so similar.
As do medical practitioners or crime investigators, we have our general schema, our protocol, which we use to carry out our investigations. Biologists search for similar DNA sequences, linguists look for similar sound sequences. In most cases, this works fine, although we are usually left with uncertainties and things that do not really seem to add up. As long as we can quietly follow the protocol, we are fine; and even if the results of our research do not necessarily last for a long time, being superceded by more recent research, we usually have the impression that we did the best we could, given the complex circumstances with their complex circumstancial evidence. But once in a while, we uncover evidence similar to video proofs in crime investigation, or wedding rings as in the Little Johnny joke — evidence that is so striking that we have to put our protocol to one side and just accept that there is only one solution, no matter what the rest of our evidence or our protocol might point to.
In 1879, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) predicted two consonantal sounds in Proto-Indo-European based on circumstantial evidence (Saussure 1879). In 1927, Jerzy Kuryłowicz (1895-1978) could show that one of the sounds was still pronounced in Hittite, an Indo-European language that was not known during Saussure's time (Lehmann 1992: 33), and had just been deciphered. While Saussure followed protocol in his investigation, Kuryłowicz provided the video proof, and only since then, Saussure's hypothesis has become communis opinio in historical linguistics.
I assume that nobody will doubt the existence of different kinds of proof, different qualities of proof, in historical disciplines. If we are left with nothing else but our protocol, we can derive certain conclusions, but we can easily abandon our protocol once we have been presented with those killer arguments, that specific kind of proof that is so striking that we do not need to bother to have a look at any alternative facts again. I do not know of any similar examples in biology, but in linguistics (and in crime investigation, at least judging from the criminal novels I have read), it is obvious that our evidence cannot only be ranked, but that we also have a huge incline between the standard evidence we use to make most of our arguments and those killer arguments that are so striking that no doubt is left.
In the short story The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, Sherlock Holmes says:
[When] you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.But this is only partially true, as in Sherlock Holmes' cases the truth is usually (but not always!) presented in such a form that it does not leave any place for doubt. Sherlock Holmes is a genius at finding the wedding rings on the fingers of his witnesses. As historical scientists, we are often much less lucky, but probably also less talented than Mr. Holmes. We are thus left with the fundamental problem of not knowing how to find the killer evidence, or how to quantify the doubt in those cases where we just follow the general protocol of our discipline.
References
- Eco, U. and T. Sebeok (1983) The Sign of Three. Dupin, Holmes, Peirce. Indiana University Press: Bloomington.
- Lehmann, W. (1992) Historical linguistics. An Introduction. Routledge: London.
- Peirce, C. (1931/1958) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.
- Saussure, F. (1879) Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-européennes. Teubner: Leipzig.
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